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The basic scheme for considering enaction is 
the dynamic sensory-motor coupling between 
an organism and its environment. The sensory 
inputs are used to guide the actions; the actions 
modify the environment and/or the relation of 
the organism to its environment, and hence 
modify in return the sensory input. This basic 
scheme applies already to animals. In the 
1920’s the German ethologist von Uexküll 
[von Uexküll, 1966] characterized animal 
worlds (for example, the “world of the tick”) 
on the basis of sensori-motor contingencies as 
they function in ecological context. 
What the world “is” for the organism 
amounts to neither more nor less than the 
consequences of its actions for its sensory 
inputs – what [O’Regan and Noe, 2001] call the 
sensori-motor contingencies; and this in turn 
clearly depends on the repertoire of possible 
actions. Without action, there is no “world”, 
and no perception. 
There is a deep affinity between this ap-
proach, the enactive approach of [Varela, 
1991], and the ecological psychology of Gibson 
according to which perception is not a matter 
of computational representation, but rather a 
direct perception of affordances 
!! "##$%&'()*+,, i.e. potential actions as 
such. This affinity lies, as we understand it, (a) 
in the fact that all of them assume a non-
representationalist framework, and (b) in the 
fact that Gibsonian rules, laws of control 
!! -$(.%$/01 /'2+1$#, [Warren, 1988], contin-
gencies !! 3*(+$%45$.$%1 )$(.4(6*()71 $%1
&*8*(&*()7, [O’Regan and Noe, 2001], all of 
them are not pre-given but emerge from the 
interaction between an organism and its envi-
ronment. 
For the purposes of this text, we are not 
going any further in the description of (discre-
pancies between) these approaches, we rather 
propose to consider what is specific to human 
beings: technical artefacts. 
One of the major characteristics of human 
worlds is that the sensory-motor coupling is 
mediated by technical artefacts. For animals, 
the sensory organs and the motor organs are 
fixed (within any given species), and they are 
attached to the body. For humans, the medi-
ation of sensory-motor coupling by technical 
artefacts introduces two radical innovations. 
Firstly, the range of possible sensory inputs 
and the repertoire of possible actions is greatly 
increased, without any limits other than the 
invention and fabrication of new artefacts. This 
is clear for the new possibilities of action which 
are created by tools, from hammers and screw-
drivers to power-tools of many sorts. It is also 
clear for instruments – microscopes, tele-
scopes, microphones, infra-red detectors, 
radios and so on resulting in sensory inputs 
which are strictly impossible without the de-
vices in question. An interesting special case is 
the sensory substitution devices [Lenay, 1997]. 
More generally, but less obviously, technical 
artefacts organize sensory experience: think of 
the world of skier, which is impossible without 
the artefact. Even when we are not actually 
skiing, our perception of the mountain is de-
termined by the possibility (i.e. virtual action) 
of skiing and the correlative sensations. So this 
first point can be understood more profoundly: 
in case of contemporary humans, there hardly 
any "natural" perceptions or relations to the 
world: our sensory-motor coupling is always 
fashioned, at least virtually, by technical arte-
facts [Khatchatourov, 2005]. 
Secondly, technical artefacts are not irre-
mediably fixed to the body. More precisely, 
technical artefacts exist in two modes: in hand 
and put down. When a technical artefact is in 
hand, being used, it becomes a prosthetic 
extension of the body; correlatively, the arte-
fact disappears from consciousness, and the 
attention of the human subject is focussed on 
the "world" that comes about (think again of 
the "world of the skier", for example). Arte-
facts, like the body, are normally transparent 
[Merleau-Ponty, 1945] to the subject; as 
[Heidegger, 1996] has pointed out, they are 
only noticed when they are dysfunctional (a 
wobbly hammer or a twisted ankle). However, 
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unlike biological organs, technical artefacts can 
also be "put down": separated from the body, 
they can now become objects of attention. In 
this mode, their objective physical proprieties 
can be perceived; they can be invented, fabrica-
ted, repaired and so on [Lenay & Sebbah, 
2001]. The whole question of learning can be 
seen as the back-and-forth movement between 
these two modes. This explains also the radical 
innovative potential of technical artefacts. Over 
several thousand years, and at an ever-
increasing rate, technical innovation has radi-
cally transformed what the world is for human 
beings. 
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